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D .. M. NUTI 
MERGERS AND DISEQUILIBRIUM IN LABOUR-MANAGED ECONOMIES 
Surnm:ary 
Cooperative mergers are both theoretically possible and 
empirically observable in labour-managed economies. This paper 
discusses system-specific differences between mergers in a 
capitalist and in a labour-managed economy. Beside the systemic 
attraction of conglomerate mergers in labour managed economies 
for the sake of risk-reduction through diversification, two 
system~specific types of mergers are considered: i) between 
capital=hungry and product-hungry cooperatives and ii) between 
cooperatives at least one of which experiences labour-surplus. 
The typical short-term inefficiency of labour deployment in 
labour-managed economies is shown to be reduced by the existence 
of the first type of merger and the apparent absence of the 
second type. In particular, the non-fulfilment of conditions 
for labour-redeployment mergers is used to attribute income 
inequality in Yugoslavia also to factors other than labour 
allocation disequilibrium. 
~ 
MERGERS AND DISE_QUILIBRIUM IN LABOUR-MANAGED ECONOMIES 
1 . Mergers and separations under labour-management 
In a labour-managed economy the freedom of enterprise and as-
sociation includes the right of enterprises to merge with each oth-
er or to split into separate subunits. This right exists both in 
the Yugoslav economy, which comes closest to the labour-managed 
model, and in Western cooperatives; it is a corollary of collective 
entrepreneurship and therefore can be regarded as an integral fea-
ture of self-management instead of a local anomaly (such as the 
virtually free use of endowment capital by Yugoslav cooperatives, 
which is not a necessary prerequisite of self-management) . 
In Yugoslavia mergers are frequently reported; their occur-
rence on a substantial scale is reflected in the slow and occasion~ 
ally negative growth rate in the number of firms (Jan Vanek, 1972; 
Sacks, 1983) and the virtual absence of bankruptcies (Moore, 1980), 
as well as large and rising average size and industrial concentra= 
tion over and above corresponding values in comparable capitalist 
economies (Dirlam and Plununer, 1973; ·Sacks, 1983; Estrin, 1983). 
Between 1960 and 1974, on average, some 4 per cent of Yugoslav 
firms merged in any year, though following a cyclical pattern 
(Estrin, 1983) Q At the same time the autonomy of enterprise subun-
its has also been recognised and gradually strengthened; in Yugo-
slav law the basic economic unit that holds assets and takes all 
but major decisions is the "basic organisation of associated la-
bour" (usually referred to as BOAL in English literature) , many of 
which may make up a~single enterprise (which is then called an o!F_!!'or_"'." 
* Acknowledgements are due to all participants in the Workshop on 
Labour-Managed Firms, at which this paper was presented, and in 
particular to Will Bartlett, for helpful comments and criticisms. 
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ganisation of associated labour") or OAL, many OALs in turn join-
ing toge~her to fc:>rm a complex OAL, or COAL. Enterprise divisions can 
withdraw from the enterprise and become totally separate units, 
or merge with other enterprises or their divisions (Sacks, 1983); 
although usually partition per se, i.e. the setting up of autono-
mous divisions within an enterprise, is a process leading to de-
centralisation within the enterprise rather than fragmentation of 
economic activity. Western cooperatives are also capable of 
merging and splitting; these are much rarer occurrences than in 
Yugoslavia, because in a capitalist setting cooperatives tend to 
concentrate in sectors without major economies of scale, but 
mergers do occur (for instance, recently among Italian coopera-
tives as a response to economic recession) . 
2. A neglected phenomenon 
Mergers (and divisions) have been mentioned in empirical 
literature on self-managed firms, though they have not been sub-
jected to the same statistical and econometric analysis of capi-
talist firms, while theoretical literature has wholly neglected 
the issue. In Vanek (Jaroslav vanek, 1971) and Vanek-inspired 
literature the birth of firms is equivalent to foundation while 
death only occurs through liquidation or bankruptcy. A thorough 
1 
search through the massive proliferation of lit·erature since 
Ward•s first paper (1958) has only vielded a couple of referenc-
es, all very recent and not of much use. 
Tyson (1979, p. 286 Sacks (1980) and Ireland and Law 
(1982, section 4.3) note in passing that partition of coopera-
tives into divisions strengthens the work incentive effect of in-
come sharing, because it reduces the attraction of Sen•s 11 free 
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riding" effect (Sen, 1966). Presumably this might encourage actu= 
al separation, though Ireland and Law also note that conglomerate 
mergers reduce income risk of members through diversification 
(1982, section 4.7) and this might discourage BOALs from splitting 
away from a conglomerate. 
Ireland and Law (1982, section 4.7) investigate the condi-
tions under which a conglomerate merger would take place so as to 
benefi.t from the efficient labour redeployment within the result-
ing unit., They argue that. two firms in short-term equilibrium and 
decreasing value of the marginal product of labour, with different 
average and therefore· marginal product of labour, will merge be-
cause internal labour redeployment will increase total combined 
net revenue. In figure 1 below (which is figure 4.9 of Ireland 
and Law, 1982) curves y
1 
and ~~ 1 with origin o1 give respectively 
the value of average income and marginal product of labour in firm 
1 as a function of membership, and o
1
A is its pre-merger member-· 








are the mirror image of 
the equivalent picture for firm 2, and A0
2 
is its pre-merger mem-
bership. After merger, Ireland and Law claim, labour will be re-
deployed efficiently and a number of workers corresponding to AB 
in figure 1 will move from division 2 (formerly firm 2) to divi-
2 
sion 1 (formerly firm 1) of the new conglomerate, equalising the 
value of the marginal product of labour at a level equal to o
1
v; 
if this is greater than the new, increased level of joint average 
income per worker, the newly formed conglomerate will expand mem-
bership (Ireland and Law, 1982). 
The implausibility of Ireland and Law's analysis will be im-
mediately apparent by applying it to the standard short-run equi-
librium of Vanek's labour-managed economy, where a large number 
of firms are in equilibrium each with the value of marginal and 
average product of labour equalised at a different level. Any 
arbitrarily chosen pair of such firms would merge following the 
Ireland and Law analysis; unless some of the resulting conglomer-
ate~ happened by sheer chance to have identical values of the 
marginal product of labour the merger process would continue 
through further rounds of mergers (even between firms who are no 
iong'er in short-term equilibrium, as long as MPVs differ) until 
the entire economy was encompassed by one single giant firm. For 
this to be a plausible process workers would have to be entitled 
to free access to jobs in any firm of their choice (Nuti, 1983). 
The point is that a~higher post-merger averaoe income per 
wor~er in the two combined firms now forming the conglomerate is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for a merger to take 
place. In the newly formed conglomerate average income must be 
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the same for all members and, therefore, post-merger average in-
come must also be higher than pre-merger average income in both 
firm 1 and firm 2. This is not the case in figure~' nor can it 
~ the ~ by construction if both f·irms display decreasing 
value of marginal product of labour and start from an equilibri-
um position.
3 
workers from firm 2 will vote unanimously and en-
thusiastically for merger with firm 1, but workers of firm 1 
will unanimously and fiercely resist it. In fact Ireland and 
Law assume that the transfer is "a centrally taken decision" but 
this can hardly explain why Yugoslav or Western cooperatives 
merge; it is against the rules of the game, since if labour was 
centrally deployed the economy in question would be undistin-
guishable from any centrally planned economy. 
Even if, untypically, a different average income was al-
lowed in division 1 and division 2, w.ithin each division income 
would have to be uniform; for merger to be agreed by workers in 
division 1 their income must remain at a level AE; uniformity 
within a division requires that workers AB should also be paid 
an income AE per head; but the workers remaining in division 2, 
far from being able to subsidise division 1 to enable it to pay 
out AE to the new enlarged membership o
1
B which only produces 
BD
1 
per head, are actually worse off than before. Therefore the 
merger will not take place. 
For the two firms to merge two additional conditions are 
·"" necessary, with respect to those assumed by Ireland and Law: 1) 
that the merger be conditional on instant partition in order to 
allow the two divisions to have different income per head; 2) 
that division 2 retain membership size A0
2 
but hire out the 
services of workers AB to division 1 at a transfer price equal to 
o
1
D, the resulting fee being divided out between all workers A0 2 
of division 2. This kind of transfer pricing is precisely what 
is envisaged by Sacks (1977, 1983) in his analysis of divisional-
isej BOALs, in order to allow some efficient redeployment of la-
bour between divisions of the same enterprise without violating 
the condition of uniform income within each division. "Now, -
Sacks writes - hiring workers without giving them a full share in 
profits and management conflicts with the basic principles of the 
Yugoslav economy. However, buying a service at a fixed price 
from another firm or division . . . ~ ·n·ot· viola·te· these· prin-
ciples, although ·it· ·amounts ·to the ·same ·t·hing. Thus the internal 
sale of services reallocates labor ·le·git·iro:at·e·ly" (Sacks, 1983, p. 
49, emphasis added) 0 
Two comments are in order. First, this kind of transfer 
pricing is a device for the efficient redeployment of labour in 
the short run which divisions of a single enterprise may wish to 
use, but which separate firms can also use without having to 
merge; hence the Irel~nd-Law-Sacks propositions do not explain 
cooperative merger at all. Second, if the principle of equality 
within the self-managed enterprise is violated, it seems prefera-
ble to use inequality efficiently and adopt the "unequal shareslt 
model devised by Meade (1974), which at least has the merit of 
eliminating all the troublesome eccentricities and inefficiencies 
of the egalitarian cooperative, including the well-known short-
-~ 
term perverse response to price changes on its employment and 
output. 
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3. Mergers of cooperatives and of eapitalist firms 
A comparative analysis of mergers of cooperatives and of capi-
talist firms reveals a number of important differences, which af-
fect both the scope for and the consequences of mergers. 
Unlike capitalist firms, cooperatives are not subject to 
"takeover bids", i.e. attempts at acquiring a controlling interest 
in the shares of a joint stock company, which may be successful in 
spite of resistance of management and the majority of shareholders. 
In the case of cooperatives all mergers must be agreed by both 
firms, therefore establishing a presumption that, in the absence of 
other offsetting factors, mergers between cooperatives are less 
likely to occur. In the theory of managerial capitalism (Marris, 
1964) the sheer potential threat of a successful takeover bid is 
sufficient to prevent managers from asserting their own growth-
minded interests over the more profit-oriented interests of share~ 
holders, therefore maintaining the stock market valuation of shares 
in the neighbourhood of the underlying value of assets because of 
managers' fear of losing their jobs following a successful takeover 
bid (which would be bound to take place if managers' reckless poli-
cies ~~ressed the value of shares sufficiently below that of company 
·assets, i.e. if the valuation ratio fell sufficiently below unity). 
There is no analogous mechanism for the cooperative to be kept 
close to the allocative solution of a traditional (i.e. non "mana-
gerial") capitalist firm8 
Given the cooperative's obligation to maintain the value of 
its net assets there is no incentive for anybody, in any case, to 
take advantage of opportunities to strip assets to EaY for the 
takeover; while, given cooperative members' entitlement to tenure 
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in the merged just as in the original firm, asset stripping oppor-
tunities are themselves restricted. Members' entitlement to con-
tinued membership also means that the takeover value of the assets 
of a cooperative - even if it could be taken over - is zero, un-
less a merger affords fresh opportunities for a more advantageous 
redeployment of joint resources; while the takeover value of an 
equivalent (joint stock or traditional) capitalist enterprise is 
at least equal to the net value of its assets, thereby providing 
the possibility of mergers simply for the purpose of achieving a 
growth rate of the value of assets greater than obtainable from 
gradual own expansion. 
Thus cooperative merger will always be due to the presence of 
opportunities for a more advantageous redeployment of joint re-
sources. These will be due to one of the following factors: in-
creased (monopolistic or monopsonistic) market power as a result 
of higher size; technological economies of scale in horizontal in-
tegration; commercial economies of scale in (vertical, horizontal 
or conglom~rate) integration for the use of a single distribution 
network; greater security of supplies and costs due to vertical 
integration; security of ievenues due to diversification following 
a conglomerate merger; other forms of greater joint allocational 
efficiency in raising the firm's maximand. All these factors can 
also be present in the case of capitalist firms' mergers, and 
mergers due to these factors are always a quick way of bridging or 
reducing a disequilibrium quicker than the gradual build-up of 
assets through the successive acquisition of individual items. 
There remain, however, important differences between the merger of 
cooperatives and of capitalist firms: 
i) in cooperatives merger a more advantageous redeployment 
of joint resources is a necessary and not just a sufficient condi-
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tion, because there lack the merger opportunities reviewed above 
for the capitalist firm; 
ii) the allocative solution after a cooperatives merger 
is different from that prevailing after a capitalist firms merg-
er and indeed, more generally, in the presence of the same type 
and intensity of factors a merger might occur in one but not the 
other type of firmse This is due primarily to the system-spe-
cific rnaximand in cooperative enterprises, i.e. income per head 
(or its present value) instead of profits (or their present val-
ue) in capitalist firms; however the difference can also be due 
to other system specific features of the labour managed economy, 
such as the workers' inability to reduce income risk through di-
versification (unlike capitalists with capital) , which gives a 
system-specific attraction to conglomerate merger (see above, 
section 2) ; 
iii) there are system-specific factors in the case of the 
cooperative mergers due to redeployment opportunities which are 
only advantageous (from the viewpoint of income per head) be-
cause of the system-specific disequilibrium in the short-term 
adjustment process of capital and employment in the labour-man-
aged firm. Because of system-specific factors both in the case 
of capitalist and cooperative firms nothing can be said,· ~ prio-
ri, as to the probability of mergers occurring more frequently 
in one or the other framework. 
In the rest o~this paper two such system-specific cases of 
possible cooperatives mergers are discussed, namely the merger 
between a capital-hungry and a product-hungry cooperative, and 
the merger between cooperative~ a~least one of which has a mem-
bership surplus; far-reaching though tentative conclusions are 
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drawn from the observation of actual instances of the first type 
of merger and the lack of observations of the second type. 
Partitions of firms (with or without splitting) are not dis-
cussed further here. In a capitalist economy such partitions are 
dictated exclusively by efficiency considerations; subunits are 
either disposed of or controlled by a holding unit and are not 
capable of voluntary separation as in the cooperative case. In 
the self-managed cooperative economy the partition of enterprises 
into subunits seems primarily a form of equality avoidance (which 
has already been illustrated in the previous section) or the con-
sequence of divergence of views, between members associated "V~!i th 
different products or processes, about future prospects and in-
vestment policy for their part of the firm, as long as assets can 
be separated without prejudice for the whole operation (which 
goes beyond the scope of this paper) . 
4. System-specific m:e·rgers: i) · ·c·a.·pital-hungry ·and ·product·-hun-
gry coopera·t·ives 
The specific and adverse features of the cooperative firm 
and the economic system it generates manifest themselves primari-
ly in the process of adjustment to change. Therefore it is natu-
ral to see whether system-specific mergers would affect that ad-
justment process. In the case of capital it is usually assumed 
that capital is brought to a sector experiencing a price increase 
(and therefore a typicall~ perverse negative· response on employ-
ment and output) through the formation of new firms. Presumably 
this is due to the specific nature of capital goods required for 
output expansion, otherwise an already existing cooperative could 
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hire capital from firms in other sectors that have not experienced 
a price increase, and eliminate or at least alleviate the perverse 
response by own expansion or by taking a leading role in the for-
mation of new divisions producing the same output and employing 
members who otherwise would be redundant. Hence the importance of 
access to capital for new cooperatives and for existing coopera-
tives in any sector experiencing a price increase. An enterprise 
in these circumstances will be "capital-hungry". On the other 
hand, any enterprise depending on the output of that sector for 
its own productive activity will be "product-hungry" and in a dif= 
ficult position, because any attempt at obtaining more of that 
product by bidding up its price will lead to further perverse re-
sponses. 
A merger between the capital-hungry and the product-hungry 
cooperatives might give the capital-hungry cooperative access to 
the further capital it needs to maintain and perhaps develop its 
membership and output already in the short run, and the product-
hungry cooperative access to a continued and expanding source of 
supply of the product it needs for maintaining its activity. Such 
a merger would ease the adjustment process, and weaken the per-
verse response to a price increase, over and above the usual ad-
vantages of security of supply offered by vertical integration. 
There is evidence of this kind of integration in literature 
on Yugoslavia. Usually vertical integration takes the form of 
long-term agreemen~, or for an indefinite period subject to ter-
mination with prior long notice of several years, for -joint expan-
sion usually under a 11 joint business council"; given the self~par= 
titioning ability of Yugoslav enterprises the effects of these ar-
rangements on~economic efficiency (though not on income distribu-
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tion) are identical to those of total mergers. Sacks (1983) re-
ports three specific cases of this kind, involving agreements be-
tween the publishing and newspaper BIGZ enterprise and the MATROZ 
paper enterprise; between tractor producer IMT and engines manu-
facturer IMR; between three firms making respectively light alloy 
metal castings (PD) , internal combustion engines (DPM) and auto-
mobiles (CZ, making the Yugoslav version of Fiat cars). 
5. System-specific mergers: ii) · redeployment from: labour-sur-
plus cooperatives 
Let us consider two cooperative firms, tabelled 1 and 2, 
whose symbols have subscript i = 1,2. Prices are assumed to be 
constant and value variables are in money terms. We use the fol-
lowing notation and relationships: 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
L. = membership = employment 
l. 
qi = output, given by the production 
q. = F. (L.) , F~ > 0, F'.' < 0 
,. l. l. l. l. l. 
A. = fixed costs 
l. 
y, = average income per head 
l. 
y. = rF. (L.) - A. l /L. = yl.. (Ll..) 
l. 1..:1. l. l..J l. 
L = pre-merger actual membership 
i 
function 
yl., = y. (L.) = pre-merger income per head 
l. l. 
L~ = pre-merger desired (equilibrium) membership, given 
l. # 
by the equilibrium condition: 
(3) 
~ 
y. (L.) = 
l. l. 
' ( !t F. L.) • 
l. l. 
A necessary condition for merger to generate a benefit at 
all is that pre-merger marginal product should differ, i.e. 
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(5) F' ':;! pw 
1 2 
Without any loss of generality let us label 1 the enterprise with 
the lower marginal product of labour, or 
Redeployment will therefore take place, if at all (i.e. if a merg-
er occurs), from 1 to 2. Therefore enterprise 1 must be a labour-
surplus cooperative; otherwise labour could be drawn from other 
sources where it could be redeployed without loss (if no such al-
ternative sources of labour are available the overall labour 
shortage should drive up labour incomes throughout the economy) 
In principle enterprise 2 does not have to be a membership-expand-
ing cooperative, but any cooperative capable of absorbing the sur-
plus labour of cooperative 1 through its own planned expansion of 
membership will be naturally preferred as merger partner to any 
labour-surplus cooperative, which could only absorb labour at a 
positive cost. 
Redeployment from 1 to 2 will take place up to the equilibri-
... 









, for which 
... 
( 6) F 1 = F' 1 2. 
(Note that the hat designates variables after the merger in the 
two firms, now regarded as subdivisions of the resulting unit.) 
We define A as the "rrllmber of redeployed workers, or 
( 7) A -




(8) G = L1 (y1 - y1) + L2(12- y2) + A(y2- y1) 
which can also be written in the form 
( 8' ) 
which together with (5') and (6) gives 
(9) G > 0 
as a general case following solely from assumption (5) . This is 
the condition given by Ireland and Law as sufficient for the merg-
er to take place. It is, however, only a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition. In the unit resulting from merger all members 
have to be treated equally, and for the merger to gain consensus 
within both cooperatives the after-merger income per head y has to 
be at least equal to, the highest of the. pre-merger incomes per 




) . Let us define R as the total 
amount necessary to bring up the members of the lower paid cooper-
ative (whi-ch can be either 1 or 2 ' since the ranking of marginal 
product of labour given in ( 5 ' ) will not necessarily correspond to 
the ·ranking of pre-merger average incomes) up to the income level 
of the higher paid cooperative. Thus 
For a merger to have the support of both cooperative memberships 
the condition must be satisfied: 
,.~ 
(11) G- R > O, 
in which case after-merger income per head y is 
- ·--,·.-=·-·,~·--~~----------------------------
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( 1 2) y = 
If both cooperatives had been in equilibrium (as in the case 
considered in section 2 above) condition (11) could not be satis-
fied and no merger would occur. In fact in equilibrium G = G~ is 
known to be positive from (8') being satisfied, but only because 




). and A are positive and 






and (y2 = y ) 2 weighted respectively by L1 and L2. But R in that 
case is equal to E
1 
(y
2 - y 1) which is greater than A (v - y"' ) be-~ 2 1 
..-.1 !f * cause A < L1; hence G - R < 0. 
If cooperative 2 is seeking to expand membership and can re-
cruit workers freely paying an equal share of its own revenue, 










in equation (10), making the fulfilment of 
condition (11) somewhat less likely. 
Here we have shown that mergers between cooperatives one of 
which, at least, is characterised by surplus labour and the other 
is probably seeking expansion of membership, are a possible oc-
currence which in the absence of friction will take place whenev-
er conditions (5) (and therefore condition (9) also) and (11) are 
satisfied. Of course there is not a single shred of evidence, in 
the massive literature on Yugoslav cooperatives, suggesting that 
r; 
this kind of adjustment to disequilibrium can be regarded as a 
possible explanation of the mergers that do occur. Paradoxical-
ly, it is precisely the fact that this kind of merger does not 
appear to occur that provides the opportunity to make interesting 
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deductions about the nature and extent of disequilibrium in the 
actual conditions of the Yugoslav economy. 
We can rewrite equation (11) as: 
( 11 1 ) 
The left-hand side is a measurement of disequilibrium, which for 
any two firms indicates the total gains obtainable at the margin 
in the two firms from internal redeployment of labour. The 
right-hand side is a measurement of differentials in average in-
come per head in the two firms, weighted by the size of the low-
er income firm. The fact that no merger appears to take place, 
not even across sectors and regions, between expanding and con-
tracting firms where gains from labour redeployment can be ex-
pected with certainty, can be used to make the following state-
ments about the Yugoslav economy - that is, of course, if its 
characterisation as a market economy inhabited by optimising 
economic agents ~ la Vanek is to be taken seriously. 
First, differentials in average incomes are greater than 
can be justified by disequilibrium in the deployment of labour. 
In other words, there is substance in the so-called "capital" 
school of thought attributing Yugoslav income differential at 
least partly to different capital endowments per head and dif-
ferent capital profitability and not, or not only, to short-run 
disequilibrium in the allocation of labour. 
Second, our neglect of the merger-induced advantages of mo-
nopolistic price-fixing strengthens considerably the above prop-
- 17 -
osition: if there are no labour-redeployment mergers in spite of 
this added attraction, then net benefits from labour redeployment 
- and hence the size of disequilibrium - are all that much lower 
than indicated even by the non-fulfilment of condition (11). 
Finally, the continued non-fulfilment of condition (11) over 
time indicates that even if there is, at any moment of time, some 
disequilibrium (though not enough to trigger off system-specific 
mergers), there is no tendency for this disequilibrium to widen 
over time. 
6. Conclusion 
The starting point of this paper is the observation that co-
operative mergers are both theoretically possible and empirically 
observable in ac~ual practice (sectton 1). Yet there appears to 
be hardly any analysis of cooperative mergers, and the necessary 
. condition of net advantag-es from labour redeployment is wrongly 
regarded as sufficient (section 2). The system-specific differ= 
ences between mergers in a capitalist and in a labour-managed 
economy are discussed in section 3c Beside the systemic attrac-
tion of conglomerate mergers in labour-managed economies for the 
sake of risk~reduction through diversification, two system-spe-
cific types of mergers are considered: that between capital-hun-
gry and product-hungry cooperatives (section 4) and that between 
cooperatives at least one of which experiences labour-surplus 
(section 5). The oostomary short-term inefficiency in labour-de-
ployment and adjustment to change, typical of textbook analysis 
of self-management, is shown to be very considerably reduced both 




absence of the second type. In particular, the non-fulfilment of 
conditions for labour-redeployment mergers is interpreted as in-
dicating support for the "capital school" attributing income ine-
quality in Yugoslavia to factors other than labour allocation 
disequilibrium. This support is strengthened by the considera-
tion of possible monopolistic advantages from cooperative merg-
ers, while the continued non-fulfilment of conditions necessary 
for labour-redeployment mergers is understood to indicate that 
disequilibrium - if any - is not widening over time. 
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NOTES 
1. With the assistance of Will Bartlett and a Dialog search from 
the Economic Literature Index Database. 
2. Ireland and Law talk of workers moving from firm 1 to firm 2 
but this obviously must be a misprint or an oversight. 
3. If one of the two firms exhibits increasing returns to scale 
its equilibrium is unstable and it should expand membership 
without merger; as long as the value of its average product 
is lower than that of the other firm it cannot offer attrac-
tive employment to the other firm's members; if it is higher 
it can attract new members from elsewhere without having to 
suffer from the fall of average product in the other firm 
that would result from drawing labourers from it. If both 
firms have an increasing value of.marginal product of labour 
their equilibrium is unstable and they will both try to ex-
pand, attracting workers from elsewhere rather than from each 
other= On the impact of disequilibrium as a starting point 
for the analysis of merger, see section 3. 
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